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Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper 
Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of 
Law 
Sarah Schindler† 
INTRODUCTION 
Instagram pictures of elegantly plated dinners, long farm-
style tables, and well-to-do people laughing in what looks like a 
loft apartment are followed by commenters asking, “Where is 
this?” This is the world of underground dining. Aspiring and es-
tablished chefs invite strangers into their homes (or their 
friends’ stores after hours, or the empty warehouse at the edge 
of town, or the nearest farm) for a night of food and revelry in 
exchange for cash. Although decidedly antiestablishment, these 
secret suppers and pop-up restaurants are popular—there are 
websites to help people locate them, and many respected publi-
cations have penned stories about their rise.1 While some munic-
ipalities have been proactive in regulating these events, in other 
locales these dinners remain completely illegal, violating health, 
zoning, employment, and business-licensing regulations. 
At the most basic level, this Essay considers what society 
should make of these dinners. In Part I, it defines underground 
dining. In Part II, it considers the benefits of regulating food es-
tablishments and the extent to which secret suppers and pop-up 
restaurants comply with existing regulatory schemes. In Part 
III, the Essay explores underground dining as part of the shar-
ing economy and addresses the concerns associated with regula-
tion in that emerging sphere. Finally, in Part IV, it asks how we 
should balance our societal commitments to entrepreneurial in-
novation, community-building, and eating good food against the 
rule of law. 
 
 † Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. Thanks to Ste-
phen Miller, Timothy Mulvaney, Jessica Owley, Kellen Zale, and Dave Owen for good 
discussions over good food, and to Rachel Trafton for excellent research assistance. 
 1 See, for example, Gregory Dicum, At Pop-Ups, Chefs Take Chances with Little 
Risk (NY Times Feb 11, 2010), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/dining/ 
12sfdine.html (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
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The answers to these questions are not straightforward. 
Just because these dinners are often illegal does not mean that 
they are necessarily bad. In some ways, underground dining is a 
form of transgression that society should celebrate: by under-
mining an arguably archaic system of food regulations, secret 
suppers could lead to meaningful reform, activate underused 
spaces, contribute to economic exchange as part of the growing 
“sharing economy,” and build community. In other ways, howev-
er, underground dining seems quite similar to old-fashioned, an-
tiregulatory libertarianism, with chefs playing the role of factory 
owners who would prefer to produce goods without having to 
worry about expensive and burdensome health and safety regu-
lations. Underlying both views is an even more troubling vision: 
skyboxification,2 represented in this instance by zones of limited 
law enforcement for the rich and well-connected, where diners 
can experience the thrill of illegal action without the real possi-
bility of punishment. In Part IV, I explore all these models in 
considering whether and how society should regulate these 
forms of meal sharing. 
I.  WHAT IS UNDERGROUND DINING? SECRET SUPPERS AND POP-
UP RESTAURANTS 
Underground dining takes many different forms. Here I will 
focus on two of the most common: secret suppers and pop-up res-
taurants. While there are no firm lines or formal regulations dis-
tinguishing these events, secret suppers are typically held in an 
individual’s home or some other nonrestaurant space.3 The food 
is generally prepared in a noncommercial kitchen, and the facili-
ty presumably has not received any formal inspections from city 
health or code-enforcement officials. Pop-up restaurants, by con-
trast, often operate in underused existing restaurant space, 
which has been inspected and contains a licensed kitchen.4 
However, they may also operate in nonrestaurant commercial 
 
 2 See Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Skyboxification of American 
Life (Huffington Post Apr 20, 2012), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael 
-sandel/what-money-cant-buy_b_1442128.html (visited Feb 26, 2015) (“[T]he marketiza-
tion of everything means that people of affluence and people of modest means lead in-
creasingly separate lives. We live and work and shop and play in different places.”). 
 3 See, for example, Dana Goodyear, Toques from Underground: The Rise of the Se-
cret Supper Club (New Yorker Dec 3, 2012), online at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2012/12/03/toques-from-underground (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 4 See Frank Bruni, The Now-You-See-It Restaurant (NY Times Jan 4, 2011), online 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/dining/05temp.html (visited Feb 26, 2015).  
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or industrial spaces, such as warehouses, functioning breweries, 
shuttered retail spaces, or outside in parks or on farms.5 These 
dining experiences differ with respect to how public or private 
they are. Some events are at the invitation of the chef; others 
require diners to be members of a group, from which only a lim-
ited number are selected for each dinner; notices for some are 
posted in the physical establishment where the event will occur; 
and invitations for others are posted on social media sites such 
as Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram.6 
Chefs have different reasons for choosing to operate in these 
nontraditional conditions. For some, it is about the food—by 
hosting small, infrequent dinners, they are able to use small 
amounts of expensive, strange, or seasonal foods that would not 
make sense in a traditional restaurant setting with large crowds 
and a set menu.7 Underground chefs also can “cook without any 
borders or limitations, [and] without having a boss” to oversee 
the operation.8 Some chefs relish the chance to connect with 
their patrons on a personal level, and the secret supper format 
gives them both the time and physical space to do so.9 
For others, the choice is more practical. Some chefs start by 
operating pop-up dinners with hopes of gaining fans while sav-
ing money in order to open a more traditional restaurant in the 
future.10 The pop-up approach is a way to avoid the worries that 
accompany a brick-and-mortar restaurant, including a mort-
gage, taxes, regular employees, and the costs of a commercial 
 
 5 See Dan Eaton, Dinner Lab Bringing Pop-Up Restaurant Parties to Columbus (Co-
lumbus Business First Dec 26, 2014), online at http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/ 
blog/2014/12/dinner-lab-brings-its-pop-up-restaurant-parties-to.html (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 6 Sarah Schindler, Unpermitted Urban Agriculture: Transgressive Actions, Chang-
ing Norms, and the Local Food Movement, 2014 Wis L Rev 369, 382. I also derived this 
information from a November 20, 2014, interview with Ian Ray, the owner of The Old 
Pal in Athens, Georgia. 
 7 See Goodyear, Toques from Underground (cited in note 3). 
 8 Allen Weiner, Inside the Secret Supper Clubs of America (Kernel Nov 16, 2014), 
online at http://kernelmag.dailydot.com/issue-sections/headline-story/10877/inside-the-secret 
-supper-clubs-of-america (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 9 See Korey Karnes Huyler, You Gotta Know Someone: Underground Dining Clubs 
(Crain’s Chicago Business Mar 14, 2014), online at http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/ 
20140314/BLOGS09/140319835/you-gotta-know-someone-underground-dining-clubs (visit-
ed Feb 26, 2015). 
 10 See Weiner, Inside the Secret Supper Clubs of America (cited in note 8). I also 
derived this information from an October 5, 2013, interview with Jessica Sheahan and 
Vien Dobui, chefs at Co ̂ng tủ’ Bột Vietnamese Pop-Up Noodle Restaurant in Portland, 
Maine. 
 2015] Regulating the Underground 19 
 
kitchen.11 Sometimes, these dinners even function as political 
statements. One chef stated that his “invite-only events are ex-
plicitly about functioning ‘outside the everyday milieus of eco-
nomic exchange. . . . [They are] alternatives to the restaurant 
industry and its ultra-capitalist, ultra-exploitative, ultra-
wasteful trappings.’”12 
From the diner’s perspective, secret suppers and pop-up res-
taurants offer an exciting, hip, and unusual dining experience.13 
The focus is often the food itself, providing diners with an oppor-
tunity to consume items that they cannot easily get elsewhere. 
And the communal-consumption aspect provides a form of social 
connectivity to others with a passion for food.14 
II.  UNDERGROUND DINING, REGULATION, AND ILLEGALITY 
Pop-ups may sound rather appealing, particularly if you are 
on the invite list: good food, a sense of community, and a certain 
hint of edgy exclusiveness reminiscent of an old speakeasy where 
patrons needed a password to get in. But there are real, im-
portant reasons that these dinners perhaps should be regulated. 
Regulations and inspections serve both public health and in-
formation-forcing purposes. Regulations limit the types of food 
that can be served or sold, and the locations in which that food 
can be prepared, in order to prevent food-borne illness.15 Fur-
ther, in choosing a restaurant, some consider its health-
inspection scores.16 Unregulated underground restaurants are 
not subject to inspection, which may put public health at risk. 
 
 11 See Goodyear, Toques from Underground (cited in note 3); Weiner, Inside the Se-
cret Supper Clubs of America (cited in note 8). 
 12 Elizabeth Kennedy, Dining off the Grid: A Movement of Movable Feasts, Secret 
Supper Clubs and Artistic Speakeasies Sates the Desires of the Culinary Crowd (The 
Monthly Mar 2008), online at http://www.themonthly.com/feature-03-08-1.html (visited 
Feb 26, 2015). 
 13 See Scott James, Underground Dining: Illegal but Tasty (Bay Citizen Jan 6, 
2011), online at https://www.baycitizen.org/columns/scott-james/underground-dining-
illegal-tasty (visited Feb 26, 2015) (“Being illicit is part of the excitement, with diners 
learning the secret locations only hours before service.”). 
 14 See Goodyear, Toques from Underground (cited in note 3); Juho Hamari, Mimmi 
Sjöklint, and Antti Ukkonen, The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collabo-
rative Consumption *2 (working paper, May 31, 2013), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271971 (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 15 See, for example, Matthew V. Bradshaw, The Rise of Urban Agriculture: A Cau-
tionary Tale—No Rules, Big Problems, 4 Wm & Mary Bus L Rev 241, 261–63 (2013); 
Ryan Almy, State v. Brown: A Test for Local Food Ordinances, 65 Me L Rev 789, 793–94 
(2013). 
 16 See, for example, James, Underground Dining (cited in note 13). 
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The lack of inspections and oversight also means that pop-ups 
are not required to report information regarding wages paid to 
any workers.17 Pop-ups also avoid requirements under the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act18 (ADA) and environmental regula-
tions.19 For example, it is difficult to determine what pop-ups do 
with their waste, such as cooking oils; brick-and-mortar restau-
rants typically must install expensive grease traps to prevent 
large amounts of oil and fat from entering the wastewater-
treatment system.20 While these regulations serve important 
functions, their applicability to underground dinners is not 
straightforward. 
This Part discusses two potential scenarios that could arise 
under the existing regulatory environment depending on the ac-
tions of the proprietors: (1) the underground restaurant operates 
in a municipality with permitting schemes in place to accommo-
date secret suppers or pop-up dinners, and the proprietors have 
obtained all proper permits and are thus operating legally; or (2) 
the municipality has a permitting scheme in place that would 
accommodate at least some aspects of underground dining, but 
the proprietors have chosen not to comply with that scheme or 
obtain the appropriate permits. 
A. Legally Compliant Underground Dinners 
As suggested by the first scenario, there are pop-up restau-
rants that comply with most, if not all, regulatory requirements. 
While some municipalities have modified their ordinances to ex-
pressly allow temporary dining, others have existing regulations 
in place that allow for some aspects of pop-ups.21 For example, a 
catering license will typically allow a chef to prepare food in her 
 
 17 See id. 
 18 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codi-
fied at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
 19 See, for example, Knight v Union/Pine, 2013 WL 4828751, *1 (D Or) (detailing 
the plaintiff’s allegation that he was excluded from attending a pop-up restaurant in vio-
lation of the ADA). 
 20 See, for example, Atlanta Department of Watershed Management, Grease Manage-
ment, online at http://www.atlantawatershed.org/inside-dwm/offices/watershed-protection/ 
grease-management (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 21 See generally, for example, Rajiv Bhatia, “Pop-Ups” and Other Non-traditional 
Temporary Food Facilities (San Francisco Department of Public Health Environmental 
Health Memo, Nov 18, 2011), online at http://www.sfdph.org/dph/files/EHSdocs/ 
ehsFood/PopUpGuidelines.pdf (visited Feb 26, 2015). See also, for example, Or Rev Stat 
§ 624.490 (allowing for temporary restaurants with payment of a reduced licensing fee). 
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certified facility and then serve it somewhere else.22 The pop-up 
dinner may thus take place in an industrial facility or a private 
home without violating food-preparation–health-and-safety reg-
ulations.23 In another example, if a chef takes over the day shift 
at a licensed restaurant facility that typically serves only dinner 
in order to host a pop-up lunch, there would likely be few legal 
concerns.24 However, the legality of the operation will still de-
pend on the details of the city’s or state’s permitting process. For 
example, in Georgia this scenario might be problematic because 
two different food-service establishments cannot share the same 
commercial kitchen.25 
Sometimes, chefs will exploit loopholes in the regulatory 
scheme in order to avoid obtaining permits while operating an 
event that is at least arguably legal. For example, some chefs at-
tempt to get around permitting issues by making events invita-
tion only and charging for attendance at the event or for accom-
panying music instead of for the food itself.26 Of course, even if a 
pop-up is legally permitted, its operations could still be illegal; 
indeed, even some fully permitted brick-and-mortar restaurants 
violate health-and-safety requirements in their operation. Anec-
dotally, I was told of a well-respected and well-reviewed restau-
rant that recently failed a health inspection when the inspectors 
discovered that the restaurant was hanging meat to cure in a 
back office, where they thought it would go undetected.27 Thus, 
just because a facility has the proper permits does not necessari-
ly mean it always complies with all regulations. However, these 
 
 22 See, for example, Md Ann Code § 10.15.03.28(G)(2). 
 23 However, the use may not be permitted under the zoning code. See, for example, 
Berkeley Municipal Code § 23C.16.010. Pop-up events often still require temporary use 
permits. See, for example, San Francisco Department of Public Health, Food Safety Pro-
gram: Temporary Food Facilities (TFFs) at Special Events, online at https://www.sfdph.org/ 
dph/EH/Food/Permits/permitSpecEvents.asp (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 24 See, for example, Ifanyi Bell, Roaming Ramen Parties Courtesy of Boke Bowl 
(OPB Apr 5, 2011), online at http://www.opb.org/artsandlife/article/boke-bowl-roaming 
-ramen-parties (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 25 See Georgia Department of Public Health, Interpretation Manual for the Rules and 
Regulations for Food Service *B17 (June 19, 2014), online at http://dph.georgia.gov/ 
sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/related_files/site_page/EnvHealthFoodSECTION%20B%20Admin
%20Guidelines.pdf (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 26 See Schindler, 2014 Wis L Rev at 382–83 (cited in note 6). Some cities have regu-
lations that allow people to obtain permits for temporary food events; these are generally 
required only for events open to the public. See, for example, Salt Lake County Health 
Department, Obtaining a Temporary Event Food Permit, online at http://slcohealth.org/ 
programs/foodProtection/tempFoodBooths.html (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 27 In this instance, the regulatory system of inspections worked and led to the dis-
covery of the violation. 
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examples suggest that it is possible for localities to craft rules 
that would regulate underground dinners; the question is 
whether the number of such dinners would be reduced because 
the proprietors would be unable or unwilling to comply with the 
requirements, and whether enforcement of the regulations 
would be practical. 
B. Noncompliant Underground Dinners 
With respect to the second scenario, the extent to which a 
secret supper or pop-up dinner is illegal depends on a variety of 
factors, including the jurisdiction in which it operates and fea-
tures of the physical space in which it is hosted. On the most il-
legal end of the spectrum, imagine a secret supper in a private 
home for which the chef charges patrons. Such a setup could vio-
late several laws. The meal is cooked in a home kitchen, which 
has presumably never been inspected or certified—this could be 
a violation of health codes that prohibit the sale of food that is 
not cooked in a commercial kitchen.28 The host’s dog lives in the 
home where the food is prepared and served—this could violate 
best practices.29 The host serves a pig that was raised and then 
killed in his backyard with a bullet to the head, and subsequent-
ly butchered in his home kitchen—this process would violate the 
requirements that meat that is sold must be slaughtered in a 
USDA-inspected slaughter facility.30 The host serves home-cured 
meat and fresh raw milk and cheese—laws often prohibit the 
sale of such products.31 The home in which the meal is served is 
located in a neighborhood zoned for residential use only—the se-
cret supper would likely constitute a business and, thus, would 
be permitted only in zones that allow home businesses (and spe-
cifically food-service businesses), either expressly or through 
conditional-use permitting.32 The pop-up would also likely require 
 
 28 See, for example, Christina Hamlett, California Requirements for a Commercial 
Kitchen (Houston Chronicle), online at http://smallbusiness.chron.com/california-
requirements-commercial-kitchen-13208.html (visited Feb 26, 2015) (stating that com-
mercial kitchens “must meet California’s environmental, safety, electrical, ventilation, 
plumbing and waste management codes”). 
 29 See 21 CFR § 110 et seq. 
 30 See, for example, 9 CFR § 302.1. 
 31 See Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the 
United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 Colum J Eur L 525, 529–33 (1998). 
 32 See, for example, Berkeley Mun Code § 23C.16.010 (prohibiting home occupa-
tions that require customer visits in certain residential districts). 
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a business license from the city.33 Fire codes generally require 
sufficient fire-suppression equipment and adequate egress,34 and 
zoning codes often limit the number of cars that can park on a 
given property.35 An unregulated, unlicensed secret supper is al-
so likely in violation of income, sales, and business-personal-
property tax requirements.36 
For some chefs, the underground-dining experience is inti-
mately tied to the avoidance of permits and licensing. This is 
driven by a theoretical desire for independence, as well as a 
practical desire to avoid “the massive overhead expense of a ful-
ly licensed establishment with all the necessary permits, bene-
fits and infrastructure.”37 This approach is risky; it sometimes 
backfires when the municipality discovers the illegal activity 
and decides to shut it down. For example, the Jersey City 
Health Department shut down a sold-out alfresco pop-up dinner 
that was to benefit a local historic cemetery and a preservation 
group. The inspectors destroyed the food after discovering that 
the pop-up’s chef failed to prepare the food in a commercial 
kitchen and failed to obtain licenses to serve food to guests in 
exchange for payment.38 Similarly, a Southern Nevada Health 
Department inspector arrived at a farm-to-table pop-up dinner 
event at a farm. Upon discovering that the meat that was to be 
served was from the farm and was not USDA certified—in addi-
tion to other problems—the inspector required the hosts to pour 
bleach on it so that it could not be eaten.39 While such events can 
be dramatic, they need not always be negative. One chef stated 
that health-department intervention was “a blessing” because it 
spurred him and his partner to pursue a legitimate restaurant 
space and “burnished their creation myth.”40 
 
 33 See, for example, Berkeley Mun Code § 9.04.035. 
 34 See, for example, Ohio Admin Code 1301:7-7-10(B)(1). 
 35 See, for example, City of Cupertino, Code & Ordinances—Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, online at http://www.cupertino.org/index.aspx?page=494 (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 36 See The Sharing Economy: Remove the Roadblocks, The Economist 18, 18 (Apr 
26, 2014). 
 37 Kennedy, Dining off the Grid (cited in note 12). 
 38 Laryssa Wirstiuk, Underground Supper Club Event at Historic Cemetery Shut Down 
by City Health Inspectors (Jersey City Independent Aug 21, 2012), online at 
http://www.jerseycityindependent.com/2012/08/underground-supper-club-event-at-cemetery 
-shut-down-by-city-health-inspectors (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 39 See J. Patrick Coolican, Farm-to-Table Event Turns Sour when Health Inspector 
Crashes Party (Las Vegas Sun Nov 12, 2011), online at http://www.lasvegassun.com/ 
news/2011/nov/12/farm--table-event-turns-sour-when-inspector-crashe (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 40 See Goodyear, Toques from Underground (cited in note 3) (“We were seedy, and 
being caught validated that we really were underground.”). 
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III.  UNDERGROUND DINING AS PART OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 
A. Defining the Sharing Economy 
Although much has been written in recent years about the 
growing sharing economy and the “peer-production economy,” 
these terms still lack crisp and coherent meanings.41 Generally, 
these ideas encompass peer-to-peer services that facilitate a “di-
rect exchange of money between individuals in return for goods 
and services.”42 Consumers are connected to producers in a de-
centralized manner, typically through technology like websites 
and applications.43 For example, Airbnb provides a platform 
through which people can allow strangers to stay in their homes, 
apartments, or spare bedrooms on a short-term basis for mon-
ey.44 Similarly, ridesharing applications like Uber and Lyft allow 
people to hail car rides from strangers who are close to them us-
ing the GPS technology in smartphones.45 
Underground dining is part of the sharing economy as well, 
although the extent to which the dinners are technology reliant 
depends in large part on the chef or host. While some prefer to 
publicize by word of mouth or physical notifications posted at 
the site of the dinner (such as information on a chalkboard), 
many rely on the Internet (including social media or e-mail lists) 
to let people know about and book their meals. A small number 
of websites compile this information and facilitate bookings and 
payment, functioning like Airbnb for secret suppers. One of 
these websites even provides insurance to chefs who use their 
web platform to list dinners.46 While communal dinners are an 
old tradition, the use of the Internet and sharing websites has 
transformed the concept by expanding the potential audience 
and reducing transaction costs such as marketing expenses.47 
 
 41 In practice, these terms are often used interchangeably. See, for example, Eli 
Lehrer and Andrew Moylan, Embracing the Peer-Production Economy, Natl Affairs 51, 
51 (Fall 2014). 
 42 Alexandra Chang, Regulation Won’t Kill the Sharing Economy. We Just Need 
New Rules, Popular Sci 28, 28 (Aug 2014). See also The Sharing Economy: Remove the 
Roadblocks, Economist at 18 (cited in note 36). 
 43 See Lehrer and Moylan, Natl Affairs at 51 (cited in note 41). 
 44 See Airbnb, About Us, online at https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (visited 
Feb 26, 2015). 
 45 See The Sharing Economy, Economist at 18 (cited in note 36). 
 46 See Feastly $1,000,000 Cook Protection, online at https://eatfeastly.com/info/ 
cook-protection (visited Feb 26, 2015) (covering personal injury to guests and damage to 
guests’ property when diners purchase their meals through the service). 
 47 See Lehrer and Moylan, Natl Affairs at 52 (cited in note 41). 
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B. Regulating the Sharing Economy 
There is a concern that “regulatory mechanisms have not 
kept pace” with advances in the sharing economy.48 This is the 
situation in which many peer-to-peer operations find them-
selves: they do not “fit established regulations, [so] they typical-
ly operate outside them, which can hurt consumers.”49 In the 
context of underground dining, many jurisdictions do not offer 
inexpensive or easy to obtain permits for temporary food estab-
lishments; rather, the permitting structures in these jurisdic-
tions are designed for more traditional brick-and-mortar restau-
rants. Thus, as was presented in the second scenario above, 
many secret suppers are unregulated. 
But there is an important difference between underground 
dining and other peer-to-peer services when it comes to regula-
tion. Some have suggested that “most of the rules that the shar-
ing economy is breaking have little to do with protecting the 
public.”50 For example, it is primarily taxi companies—not poten-
tial riders—that oppose Lyft and Uber due to a fear of being un-
dercut by these services’ lower prices.51 Similarly, it is the hotels 
that are losing business and cities that are losing tax revenue 
that have most actively opposed services like Airbnb. This argu-
ment might understate the public benefit that attaches to the 
regulation of entry into the hotel or taxi business.52 But to the ex-
tent that it is valid, regulating underground dining is different. 
The regulation of food preparation is fundamentally about 
protecting the public; with underground dining, there is a true 
public health concern. Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle provides a 
time capsule of our history of unregulated meat production.53 
That text was directly responsible for the passage of our first 
 
 48 Molly Cohen and Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the 
Sharing Economy, 58 Boston Bar J 6, 6 (2014). 
 49 Chang, Popular Sci at 28 (cited in note 42). 
 50 The Sharing Economy, Economist at 18 (cited in note 36). 
 51 Id. See also Chang, Popular Sci at 28 (cited in note 42) (“[C]ritics argue that op-
erating without regulation gives start-ups an unfair advantage over highly regulated 
incumbents. It also opens the door to misconduct.”). 
 52 Many neighbors and condominium associations believe that short-term vacation 
rentals are detrimental to their communities. And regulated businesses such as hotels 
and taxi companies must comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, and other laws. Even if most individuals are not complaining, 
there may still be legitimate underlying public safety, health, and welfare reasons for 
regulating these fields. 
 53 See generally Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (Sinclair 1920). 
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federal food-safety laws: the Food and Drugs Act of 190654 and 
the Federal Meat Inspection Act.55 People care about the en-
forcement of food-safety laws because there is a real interest in 
preventing and avoiding food-borne illness;56 these regulations 
have much less to do with issues like competition and taxes than 
with public health.57 This distinction suggests that regulating 
underground dining might be more important, more squarely 
within the standard police powers, and more in line with the 
popular view of the proper role of government than regulating 
other manifestations of the sharing economy. 
IV.  EVALUATING UNDERGROUND DINING: THE ROLE OF 
PRIVILEGE AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
As I explained in the Introduction, one can view under-
ground dining through a variety of lenses.  Each lens leads to a 
distinct set of conclusions about the desirability of underground 
dining, which then leads to conclusions about whether and how 
underground dining should be regulated. This Part examines 
each lens, and its implications, in turn. 
A. Underground Dining as Community Building 
In deciding whether to regulate secret suppers and pop-up 
dinners, local governments should consider their value. There is 
social value in underground dining in that it enhances commu-
nities; secret suppers and pop-up restaurants contribute to the 
social, cultural, and even political lives of the municipalities in 
 
 54 Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat 768. 
 55 Act of Mar 4, 1907, 34 Stat 1256, 1260, codified at 21 USC § 601 et seq. See Ad-
am Cohen, 100 Years Later, the Food Industry Is Still ‘The Jungle’ (NY Times Jan 2, 
2007), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/opinion/02tue4.html (visited Feb 26, 
2015). 
 56 US Public Health Service, Food Code 2013 *1, online at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/UCM374510.pdf 
(visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 57 Of course, restaurant permitting requirements are also a source of tax revenue. 
And there is certainly a competition issue. For example, many brick-and-mortar restau-
rants are opposed to the operation of food trucks too close to their establishments. See Sa-
rah E. Needleman, Street Fight: Food Trucks vs. Restaurants (Wall St J Aug 9, 2012), 
online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443404004577576992254177540 
(visited Feb 26, 2015). However, I have not uncovered similar concerns with respect to 
secret suppers and, in fact, a number of well-known chefs who operate brick-and-mortar 
restaurants also participate in pop-ups. Perhaps the difference is that pop-ups are by 
their nature more transitory and consequently present less of a concern as a form of 
long-term competition. 
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which they occur. Pop-ups often enliven vacant and underused 
space, efficiently contributing to the vibrancy, diversity, and cul-
ture of the food industry and the community.58 Secret suppers 
that take place in private homes foster social interaction and 
connectivity among neighbors and visitors who dine together at 
communal tables. These activities build social capital, thus 
providing a public benefit; the question is whether and to what 
extent that benefit outweighs the accompanying risk to public 
health.59 
Recognizing their benefits, and in order to encourage their 
proliferation, some cities have already begun decreasing the 
regulatory burden on pop-up facilities. For example, Oregon 
provides low-cost licenses for intermittent, seasonal, and single-
event restaurants, which reduce the overhead that might other-
wise be required for a traditional restaurant.60 Thus, there are 
ways to create a regulatory system with a minimal cost burden 
and flexible rules so that chefs who are beginning their careers 
do not face the standard financial barriers to entry that accom-
pany brick-and-mortar restaurants. That said, these temporary 
restaurants must still comply with certain health-code provi-
sions and inspections;61 they are not free to serve whatever they 
want, however they want. So while the barrier to entry carries a 
reduced burden, the activities that can be undertaken within the 
restaurant are still limited. This suggests that further deregula-
tion might be necessary to allow underground dining to achieve 
its goals. In choosing to deregulate, the locality allows individu-
als to choose whether to assume the risk of food-borne illness 
 
 58 In crafting its fairly permissive regulations to allow pop-ups, San Francisco’s 
health department stated, “Pop-ups are becoming an important part of the diversity in 
San Francisco’s vibrant food industry. The Department supports this diversity yet also 
needs to ensure that all food facilities comply with health and safety rules.” Bhatia, 
“Pop-Ups” and Other Non-traditional Temporary Food Facilities (cited in note 21). 
 59 See, for example, Jim Saksa, How the Pop-Ups Can Actually Prop Up Their 
Neighbors (PlanPhilly July 28, 2014), online at http://planphilly.com/articles/2014/07/28/ 
how-the-pop-ups-can-actually-prop-up-their-neighbors (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 60 Or Rev Stat § 624.490. See also Or Rev Stat § 624.010(4) (defining “intermittent 
temporary restaurant”). Underground dinners may also sometimes fit within existing 
provisions for temporary or special food-service permits. See, for example, Md Ann Code 
§ 10.15.03.02(78)(a)(iii) (defining “special food service facility” as one “for which the 
[Health] Department provides exceptions to certain regulations because of the . . . 
[l]imited length of time that the facility operates in association with special events”). 
 61 See, for example, Or Rev Stat § 624.091. 
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that may accompany the community-centered benefits that they 
find.62 
B. Underground Dining as Rebellion 
Although many secret suppers and pop-up dinners are cur-
rently illegal—at least in part—there are benefits to rebellious, 
unauthorized actions.63 Specifically, they may act as catalysts for 
bringing attention to, and ultimately changing, outdated laws;64 
participation in these transgressive activities furthers political 
goals. 
Our existing food-safety regulations serve to “check abuses” 
by large-scale food producers.65 For example, four companies kill 
and process over 80 percent of the 35 million cows that are 
slaughtered for consumption each year in the United States.66 
Industrialized factory farming, which takes place within Con-
centrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), produces the 
majority of the meat that people consume in the United States.67 
However, many patrons of underground restaurants expressly 
want to avoid food produced through those systems—which they 
view as cruel and environmentally harmful68—and thus seek out 
alternatives to traditional restaurant options. Our current regu-
latory system makes that very difficult to do; in many communi-
ties, one must forage for vegetables, raise and slaughter one’s 
own meat, and then cook those items for oneself in order to 
avoid industrialized agricultural products and the restaurants 
 
 62 See, for example, Dana Goodyear, Is Raw Milk Worth It? The Case of the Single-
Udder Butter (New Yorker Apr 22, 2012), online at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
culture/culture-desk/is-raw-milk-worth-it-the-case-of-the-single-udder-butter (visited 
Feb 26, 2015). 
 63 See Schindler, 2014 Wis L Rev at 387–91 (cited in note 6). 
 64 See id. See also generally Eduardo Moisés Peñalver and Sonia K. Katyal, Proper-
ty Outlaws, 155 U Pa L Rev 1095 (2007); Michael Pollan, Farmer in Chief (NY Times 
Magazine, Oct 12, 2008), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/magazine/ 
12policy-t.html (visited Feb 26, 2015) (discussing outdated food-safety laws) 
 65 Pollan, Farmer in Chief (cited in note 64). 
 66 Emilene Ostlind, Big Beef: Cattlemen Struggle against Giant Meatpackers and 
Economic Squeezes, High Country News 10, 12 (Mar 21, 2011). 
 67 See Doug Gurian-Sherman, CAFOs Uncovered: The Untold Costs of Confined An-
imal Feeding Operations *2 (Union of Concerned Scientists Apr 2008), online at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/food_and_agriculture/ 
cafos-uncovered.pdf (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 68 See Catherine Groves, To Promote Compliance with the Clean Water Act, the 
EPA Should Pursue a National Enforcement Initiative to Regulate Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operations, 39 Ecol L Q 321, 323 (2012) (“[CAFOs] create vast amounts of ma-
nure that harms the environment and human health by entering our waterways.”). 
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that serve them. Viewing underground dining as an act of rebel-
lion against outdated food-safety laws, one could posit that, if 
the demand for underground dinners that serve alternative, lo-
cal foods grows large enough, the laws might change. Thus, their 
current status as lawbreaking events is helpful. 
C. Antiregulatory Libertarian Values and Food Sovereignty 
There is a sense, both from chefs who choose to avoid the 
permitting process and enter the realm of the unlicensed under-
ground, and from the clientele who patronize these events, that 
these actors would rather the government stay out of the way. 
The idea ties into a larger debate anchored in civil-libertarian 
views and a narrower one about the “nanny state” and public 
health paternalism.69 While the government’s police powers al-
low it to regulate in furtherance of public health and safety, 
some commentators believe that the government should focus its 
regulatory authority on other-regarding, rather than self-
regarding, harm.70 If people consume uninspected food from un-
licensed kitchens with the knowledge that they are doing so, 
their risk of food-borne illness would be considered self-
regarding.71 Further, the market is especially active here given 
that secret suppers and pop-up dinners are often coordinated 
through websites on which people can leave reviews.72 If enough 
people were to get sick at a given underground dinner and 
write reviews to that effect, then the chef’s reputation would 
be harmed and others might stop attending.73 Similarly, the 
 
 69 See, for example, Lindsay F. Wiley, Micah L. Berman, and Doug Blanke, Who’s 
Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age of Personal Responsibil-
ity, 41 J L, Med & Ethics 88, 88 (2013) (“Arguments about public health paternalism . . . 
are playing a role in political opposition to the adoption of new policy interventions and 
in legal challenges aimed at striking down existing public health laws.”). 
 70 See, for example, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 23 (Ticknor & Fields 1863) (“That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civi-
lized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”); Wiley, Berman, and Blanke, 41 J L, Med 
& Ethics at 89 (cited in note 69). 
 71 Of course, no action is completely isolated; if more people are getting sick from 
food, insurance premiums may increase whether the people getting sick have insurance 
or not. 
 72 See note 46. 
 73 See David Adam Friedman, Micropaternalism, 88 Tulane L Rev 75, 93 (2013) (“A 
purely libertarian approach . . . would assume two things: (1) consumers should be able 
to preserve their autonomy to make choices to consume certain things even if they are 
self-harming and/or (2) that even if the harm is of concern, regulatory intervention is 
unnecessary because as information spreads, behavior will change.”). 
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direct-to-consumer and infrequent nature of underground res-
taurants suggests that an instance of food-borne illness will be 
easily traceable; the same occurrence at a chain restaurant with 
a broad distribution network could result in a public health 
emergency.74 
From the individual’s perspective, perhaps it is her liberty 
interest that primarily motivates the desire for a lack of regula-
tion: I want to be able to pay money to eat good food prepared by 
someone whom I trust. But from the chef’s perspective, it is hard 
to separate a true interest in personal liberty from the desire to 
operate cheaply, without expensive permits or time-consuming 
inspections: I want to serve raw milk and home-slaughtered pig, 
but I also cannot afford to spend the money to open a permitted 
restaurant and install an expensive commercial kitchen and 
grease trap.75 Soda manufacturers and cigarette makers use 
these sorts of libertarian and antipaternalism arguments to 
counter governmental health regulations.76 But those claims are 
made in conjunction with a desire to further a successful busi-
ness. Similarly, factory owners historically fought against the 
 
 74 See, for example, Company News; Jack in the Box’s Worst Nightmare (NY Times 
Feb 6, 1993), online at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/06/business/company-news-jack 
-in-the-box-s-worst-nightmare.html (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 75 A chef who operates secret suppers out of his home could also argue that he is 
exercising a fundamental aspect of his property rights: the right to include. See Daniel B. 
Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 Emory L J 857, 859 (2014) (“[T]he ability of owners to ‘in-
clude’ others in their property is a central attribute of ownership and fundamental to any 
system of private property.”). See also generally Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fun-
damental Civil Right, 29 Cal W L Rev 187 (1992). Further, activities taking place within 
the home have historically received heightened levels of protection. See Payton v New 
York, 445 US 573, 601 (1980) (“[An] overriding respect for the sanctity of the home [ ] has 
been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”). Although pop-ups in 
nonresidential or public spaces might lack these property rights justifications, to the ex-
tent that a secret supper is taking place in a home that is owned or leased by the host, 
some might argue in favor of less regulation. That said, the law may limit the way that 
we use our property. See State v Shack, 277 A2d 369, 371–72, 374 (NJ 1971). The right to 
include would not extend so far as to protect the inclusion of clearly illegal activities in 
one’s home. 
 76 For discussions of this phenomenon, see Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do 
about Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 Georgetown L J 1361, 1362 (2005) 
(“Opponents of government intervention see the obesity controversy as a giant govern-
ment land grab . . . they invoke the language of liberty and freedom on their own be-
half.”); Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian Pater-
nalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law, 81 U Chi L Rev 291, 304 (2014) 
(discussing smoking bans). 
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adoption of environmental regulations because dumping waste 
into nearby rivers was cheap and easy.77 
Protecting liberty values is important, but few would want 
to return to the era of meat production completely free from reg-
ulation, as described in The Jungle. Further, despite the efforts 
of food-sovereignty advocates, there is no fundamental right to 
purchase, or even consume, the foods that one wants.78 Thus, 
while liberty interests are certainly important, it is unclear 
whether they outweigh the legitimate public health justifica-
tions that support the regulation of underground food. 
D. A Privileged Clientele 
An interesting element of underground dining that is not of-
ten written about or even discussed is the privileged clientele 
that frequent many of these shared meals. It is not uncommon 
for a place at the table to cost nearly $100.79 Thus, a patron must 
be able to afford to attend the pop-up dinner and must also be in 
the know about the event.80 
If a city were to exempt pop-ups from regulations, one could at 
least question whether it was in part because these meals were at-
tended by residents with money and political clout—people whom 
the city wants to attract and appease. There may be an assump-
tion that wealthy, young urbanites are both underground chef and 
 
 77 See Neil Stoloff, Regulating the Environment: An Overview of Federal Environ-
mental Law 1 (Oceana 1991). 
 78 See Ravin v State, 537 P2d 494, 501–04 (Alaska 1975) (determining that “the 
ingestion of food, beverages or other substances” is not a fundamental right); Samuel R. 
Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 Me L Rev 737, 742 (2013) (exploring “whether food choice 
activists can persuasively claim a fundamental right to liberty of palate [and] finding a 
low likelihood of success”); Brief in Support of United States’ Motion to Dismiss Plain-
tiff’s Amended Complaint, Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund v. Sebelius, No C 10-
4018-MWB, *26 (ND Iowa filed Apr 26, 2010) (“[T]here is no ‘deeply rooted’ historical 
tradition of unfettered access to foods of all kinds. . . . [P]laintiffs do not have a funda-
mental right to obtain any food they wish.”). Although some have argued otherwise, their 
arguments have not yet proven successful. See, for example, Farm-to-Consumer Legal 
Defense Fund v Sebelius, 734 F Supp 2d 668, 679–80 (ND Iowa 2010) (noting that the 
plaintiffs “allege that they have a fundamental right to raise their family in their own 
way, and to their own bodily and physical health, which rights include the right to de-
termine what foods they do and do not choose to consume for themselves and their fami-
lies”). See also David E. Gumpert, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Food Rights: The Es-
calating Battle over Who Decides What We Eat 5 (Chelsea Green 2013); David J. Berg, 
Food Choice Is a Fundamental Liberty Right, 9 J Food L & Pol 173, 177 (2013). 
 79 See Goodyear, Toques from Underground (cited in note 3). 
 80 See Kennedy, Dining off the Grid (cited in note 12); Adam H. Graham, World’s 
Best Pop-Up Restaurants (Departures Aug 1 2012), online at http://www.departures.com/ 
articles/worlds-best-pop-up-restaurants (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
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patron, and the kitchens are clean.81 But allowing underground 
dining to proliferate without regulation provides special treat-
ment to—and stratifies and separates—wealthy patrons from 
others who are not involved in the underground-dining scene.82 
This example of skyboxification is problematic for a number 
of reasons. First, as society creates different venues for different 
classes of people, individuals are not forced to mingle with, 
speak to, or acknowledge those who are different. Moreover, alt-
hough paying patrons are required for these events to succeed, if 
regulators intervene and shut down a dinner, the patrons them-
selves would not be punished.83 Thus, diners can enjoy the thrill 
of an illegal event without fear of repercussions. Further, sky-
boxification might also undermine efforts at rebellious reform. 
Instead of working to change the outdated regulatory system 
that requires animals to be killed in certified slaughterhouses 
instead of under less stressful environs, underground diners can 
just avoid the system by seeking out illegal alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
Secret suppers and pop-up restaurants present a series of 
conflicting issues. We want to allow for innovation that improves 
communities, and for individuals to make interesting and di-
verse food choices; but we also want to protect public health, en-
sure that workers are treated well, and control when and where 
businesses are appropriate in residential neighborhoods. Eli 
Lehrer and Andrew Moylan discuss this conflict: 
Underground restaurants opened in people’s homes really 
do leave customers without the security of regular inspec-
tions and food-sanitation certificates. A number of these 
supper clubs specialize in relatively risky foods like raw 
 
 81 Food-safety risks are greater than many realize. See Stacy M. Crim, et al, Inci-
dence and Trends of Infection with Pathogens Transmitted Commonly through Food, 63 
Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report 328, 328  (Apr 18, 2014) (“In 2013, a total of 
19,056 infections, 4,200 hospitalizations, and 80 deaths were reported. For most infec-
tions, incidence was well above national Healthy People 2020 incidence targets.”). 
 82 This is not unique. “Pay to play” has long been a feature of our society, and we 
allow individuals to take dangerous actions at their own risk if they can afford to do so. 
For example, the risk of avalanche and death accompany backcountry skiing, yet it is 
allowed in some locations (including on many ski mountains that used to prohibit it). See 
Katie Zezima, Banner Year for Skiing, and for Search Parties (NY Times Feb 21, 2011), 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2012/snow-fall (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 83 But consider, for example, Ca Penal Code § 597.5(b) (making it illegal to be a 
spectator at a dog fight). 
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milk and sushi . . . . These sorts of services may genuinely 
raise public-health and safety concerns. What’s needed is a 
legal framework in which peer-production services may 
thrive and grow, but where the legitimate public-policy in-
terests of preserving public health and standards of safety 
and protecting individuals from fraud are maintained.84 
The key is in arriving at the appropriate balance. If we 
choose to regulate these entities, we need to determine what 
those regulations should look like. Should they mirror existing 
regulations for brick-and-mortar restaurants,85 or should they be 
more permissive?86 And if they should be more permissive, 
why?87 On the other hand, we could decide to let these entities 
operate as they wish without regulation. Enforcement would be 
difficult, and even the existence of regulation may discourage 
these restaurants from operating.88 If no regulation or licensing 
were required, this would leave patrons, who are often well-
educated, to assume the risk of any harm that may befall them 
as a result of consuming unregulated food produced and served 
in uninspected facilities. We could also pursue a middle ground. 
To satisfy free market proponents while also ensuring some lev-
el of oversight, localities could require insurance instead of li-
censes and inspections.89 Under this approach, insurers “could 
determine whether home-based restaurants that serve raw milk 
and sushi are reasonably safe.”90 
 
 84 Lehrer and Moylan, Natl Affairs at 55–56 (cited in note 41). 
 85 Id at 59 (“Where feasible and reasonable, lawmakers should try to model peer-
production regulations on the existing rules for comparable services.”). 
 86 With respect to the sharing economy, “the core of the conundrum is the fact that 
our laws were designed to regulate relationships in a competitive economy, not a collabo-
rative one.” Jenny Kassan and Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Econo-
my, 27 J Envir L & Litig 1, 13 (2012). 
 87 Emily Badger, The Street Hacker, Officially Embraced, CityLab (The Atlantic 
May 7, 2012), online at http://www.theatlanticcities.com/neighborhoods/2012/05/street 
-hacker-officially-embraced/1921 (visited Feb 26, 2015). 
 88 But see Lehrer and Moylan, Natl Affairs at 59 (cited in note 41) (“[T]he fact that 
existing regulations would be difficult to impose on peer-production activities does not 
vitiate the legitimate public interests those rules are meant to serve.”). 
 89 See Lehrer and Moylan, Natl Affairs at 59 (cited in note 41) (suggesting that pol-
icymakers “look to mandatory insurance or surety and fidelity bonds to address some of 
the concerns that would otherwise be handled by prescriptive regulation”). 
 90 Id at 60. Some of the websites that promote and facilitate secret suppers have 
begun to provide insurance to hosts, but it is unclear whether these websites actually 
inspect the facilities before doing so. Therefore, their health-protection value is not as 
strong as it could be with governmental oversight. 
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In order to arrive at an appropriate decision, a municipality 
should determine the existence of and demand for underground 
dining in its community, weigh the competing considerations 
addressed in this Essay, and make a regulatory determination. 
On balance, it seems that most municipalities should be able to 
craft a low-cost, low-hassle permitting system—potentially with 
insurance requirements—in order to ensure at least a base level 
of oversight. This would remove some uncertainty from the pro-
cess while still allowing chefs and would-be patrons to safely 
enhance and challenge their local dining status quo. 
